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CHAPTER 12: FEATURING PEOPLE IN ADS 
 
 
 
Advertisements routinely depict people—their image, name, voice and other aspects of their 
personality.  This chapter looks at the special legal issues that arise from depicting people in ads. 
 
 
1. Overview of Publicity Rights 
 
Publicity rights generally protect the use of people’s names, images, voices or other personality 
attributes from unconsented commercialization.  Initially, publicity rights were considered part 
of a person’s privacy rights.   
 
In the United States, privacy rights generally trace back to the immensely influential privacy 
article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARVARD L. REV. 
193 (1890).  Both Warren and Brandeis were lawyers at the time; Brandeis went on to become a 
celebrated U.S. Supreme Court justice.  The authors were reacting to improvements in camera 
technology.  Initially, camera shutter speeds were so slow that people had to pose (i.e., stand 
still) for photographs.  However, technological evolutions reduced shutter speeds, which allowed 
photographers to take unconsented photos of people.  Warren and Brandeis argued that “the 
existing law affords a principle from which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the 
individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor 
of any other modern device for rewording or reproducing scenes or sounds.” 
 
Recapping privacy law in the early 1960s, Dean William Prosser classified privacy legal claims 
over the intervening seventy years into four categories.  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) and RESTATEMENTS (SECONDS) OF TORTS (for which Prosser was the 
reporter).  As defined by Prosser, the key for our purposes here is category 4, “Appropriation, for 
the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness,” which has evolved into the 
modern “publicity right.” 
 
Although the publicity rights doctrine is well recognized, its legal implementation is a little 
chaotic.  There is no federal publicity right.  Currently, twenty-eight states statutorily codify 
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publicity rights, and some statutes explicitly provide that publicity rights survive beyond a 
person’s death.  See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 3344.1 (surviving rights for seventy years post-
mortem); Indiana Code 32-36 (surviving rights for 100 years post-mortem).  In some states, 
publicity rights are protected by way of common law doctrines.  California protects publicity 
rights both by statute and the common law.   
 
Because many celebrities reside there, California and New York play particularly important roles 
in the development of publicity rights laws.  However, publicity rights are not limited to 
celebrities, and they usually equally protect both well-known and unknown individuals. 
 
Publicity rights generally govern two discrete activities: first, the “merchandizing” of a person by 
selling an item that incorporates some identifiable part of the person, such as the incorporation of 
a celebrity’s image on a t-shirt, and second, the depiction of a person in ad copy.  Typically, the 
ad copy cases are doctrinally easier than the merchandizing cases, but both types of cases can 
create difficult line-drawing situations.  In addition, the publicity rights doctrines have an uneasy 
fit with the First Amendment, especially in the merchandizing context.  
 
Publicity rights only apply to individuals; companies or other business organizations “protect 
their name” through trademark law and related doctrines.  If a person’s name develops secondary 
meaning in association with commercial offerings, people can develop trademark rights in their 
name or other attributes to complement their publicity rights (which exist automatically).  When 
enforcing those rights, trademark law requires that the usage creates a likelihood of consumer 
confusion.  (Recall the Lamparello v. Falwell case from Chapter 10.)  In contrast, no consumer 
confusion is required for a publicity rights claim.  
 
 
2. Publicity Rights and Ad Copy 
 
As a baseline proposition with only limited exceptions, depicting a person in ad copy requires the 
person’s consent.  Even with this fairly clear rule, plenty of ambiguity remains.  This part looks 
at the depiction of various personality attributes to explore the boundaries of the publicity rights 
doctrine. 
 
A. A Person’s Name 
 
In reading this opinion, it may be helpful to know that a “Henley shirt” is a collarless polo shirt.  
It is named after Henley-on-Thames, England, whose rowers wore uniforms in this style. 
 
 
Henley v. Dillard Department Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999) 
 
. . . FACTS . . . 
 
Plaintiff Donald Hugh Henley (“Henley” or “Plaintiff”), is a popular and critically acclaimed 
rock and roll musician.  He began his music career in the 1970s as the founder and member of 
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the band The Eagles.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Henley maintained a successful solo career by 
continuing to produce platinum albums and perform on tour in concerts around the world. 
 
On September 3 and 4, 1997, Defendant Dillard Department Stores (“Dillard” or “Defendant”) 
ran a newspaper advertisement for a shirt known as a “henley.”  The ad features a photograph of 
a man wearing a henley shirt with the words, “This is Don” in large print, beside the picture, and 
an arrow pointing toward the man’s head from the words.  Underneath the words is the 
statement, “This is Don’s henley” in the same size print, with a second arrow pointing to the 
shirt.  The advertisement also included the name of the retailer, “Dillard’s”, general information 
about the sale price of the shirts, the name of the shirt’s manufacturer, the available sizes and the 
following: “Sometimes Don tucks it in; other times he wears it loose—it looks great either way.  
Don loves his henley; you will too.”  The ad ran in newspapers throughout Texas and in Mexico. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION . . . 
 
B.  Right to Publicity 
 
The right of publicity is often described as the “inherent right of every human being to control 
the commercial use of his or her identity.”  The right to publicity is considered an intellectual 
property right.  It is a more expansive right than any common law or statutory trademark 
infringement right because it does not require a showing of likelihood of confusion. 
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The tort of misappropriation of one’s name or likeness is generally referred to as the “Right of 
Publicity” and is based on section 652C of the Restatement of Torts which reads, “One who 
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy.”  The Fifth Circuit has specifically identified three elements a 
plaintiff must prove to recover for the tort of misappropriation of name and likeness in Texas: (1) 
the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the value associated with it, and 
not in an incidental manner or for a newsworthy purpose; (2) the plaintiff can be identified from 
the publication; and (3) there was some advantage or benefit to the defendant. 
 
The right of publicity is designed to protect the commercial interests of celebrities in their 
identities.  It is intended to protect the value of a celebrity’s notoriety or skill.  Because a 
celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, “the celebrity has an interest 
that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”  Such 
celebrities have an exclusive legal right to control and profit from the commercial use of their 
name, personality and identity.  “If the celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, there has 
been an invasion of his right whether or not his ‘name or likeness’ is used.”  The tort does not 
protect the use of the celebrity’s name per se, but rather the value associated with that name. . . . 
 
1.  Did Defendant Appropriate the Plaintiff’s Name or Likeness for the Value Associated with it, 
and not in an Incidental Manner or for a Newsworthy Purpose? 
 
The threshold issue to determine in analyzing this element is whether Defendant actually 
appropriated Defendant’s name or likeness. . . . 
 
While use of the expression “Don’s henley” is arguably the use of Plaintiff’s name, a genuine 
issue of fact exists as to whether that expression is, indeed, Plaintiff’s name.  However, Courts 
have recognized that a defendant may be held liable for using a phrase or image that clearly 
identifies the celebrity, in addition to finding liability for using a plaintiff’s precise name.  
Because the use of the expression “Don’s henley” is so clearly recognizable as a likeness of 
Plaintiff, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that the phrase “Don’s henley” 
does not clearly identify the Plaintiff, Don Henley. . . . 
 
The second issue the Court must resolve is whether Defendant appropriated Plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for the value associated with it, and not in an incidental manner.  Defendant argues that 
“there has been no evidence presented that Dillard chose to use the wording ‘Don’s henley’ in 
order to capitalize on the alleged value of the name Don Henley.”  The Court disagrees, and in 
fact, finds that Defendant has presented no reasonable evidence to defeat Plaintiff’s summary 
judgment motion.  Plaintiff presents uncontroverted deposition testimony from Lisa M. 
Robertson, the creator of the print advertisement, admitting that use of Don Henley’s ‘name’ was 
intended to make the ad more interesting.  She . . . intended to use the expression as a “play on 
words” and intended consumers to recognize this advertisement as a “wordplay” on the name 
“Don Henley.”2  In other words, Defendant admitted that she did not intend potential consumers 
                                                 
2 Q: Well, what prompted you to come up with the idea “This is Don. This is Don’s Henley”? 
A: Well, I was trying to find a play on words to use for the ad. 
Q: And there’s no doubt that when you were using the words “This is Don.  This is Don’s henley,” the Don Henley 
wordplay meant Don Henley the recording artist, not some other person named Don Henley? 
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to perceive the ad as depicting an anonymous man named “Don.”  She intended for them to 
associate the expression “Don’s henley” with the Plaintiff Don Henley.  Furthermore, Debra L. 
Green, the ad’s designer, admitted that she believed the expression “Don’s henley” would catch 
the consumers’ eye because of its similarity to the name “Don Henley.”3  Therefore, Defendant 
admits Dillard used the play on words, “Don’s henley” to attract consumers as they associated 
the expression and the ad with Plaintiff Don Henley.  In other words, they used the value 
associated with Don Henley’s identity and personality in order to attract consumers’ attention. 
 
Defendant presents testimony from Dillard’s Vice President of Sales Promotion, William B. 
Warner, suggesting that the use of the words “Don’s henley” adds no value to the 
advertisement.4  Warner testified that he believes there is no value associated with the expression 
“Don’s henley,” and that the singular and sole purpose of choosing and printing that phrase was 
“fun.”  In fact, Defendant argues, the use of the expression, “Don’s henley” was incidental to the 
primary focus of the advertisement.  The portions of the ad that were of “chief importance” were 
the “handwritten text and arrows . . . the visual presentation of information.” . . .  
 
. . . The Court finds it unreasonable to draw the inference Defendant requests.  Defendant’s 
evidence could not lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the use of the words “Don’s henley” 
was for any purpose other than to attract the attention of consumers. 
 
Defendant also insists that its use of the phrase “Don’s henley” was incidental to the handwritten 
style of the text and arrows.  “‘[O]ne of the primary purposes of advertising is to motivate a 
decision to purchase a particular product or service.  The first step toward selling a product or 
service is to attract the consumers’ attention.’”  Defendant’s use of the message “This is Don.  
This is Don’s henley.” in large letters, centered in the print ad was clearly and admittedly 
intended to attract the consumers’ attention.  The Court is hard pressed to believe that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the size and style of the letters, rather than the message 
                                                                                                                                                             
A: Well, obviously the name—yes, I mean I knew it was Don Henley; that was where it came from.  But it wasn’t, 
you know, to imply that he was a part of it. 
Q: I think you said earlier that by using the word—by using the headline “This is Don.  This is Don’s henley,” you 
intended a wordplay, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And so it was your intention for consumers to recognize this advertisement as a wordplay. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And for the wordplay to work, the consumer had to recognize the name Don Henley, right? 
A: Well, you’d have to know who he was to get it, yes. 
Q: So for it to work or for them to get it, they must recognize the similarity between the words “This is Don.  This is 
Don’s henley” and the name of the recording artist Don Henley, correct? 
A: Yes. 
3 Q: Do you think that the words “Don’s,” apostrophe “s,” “henley” would catch a consumer’s eye? 
A: I think the sound of them reading it would repeat the sound of—I think that that would in some way associate 
with Don. 
Q: Well, my question is would it have caught your average consumer’s eye, the use of the words “Don’s henley”? 
A: I think so. 
4 Q: Did the words—in your opinion, do the words “Don” and “Don’s henley” help make the ad more effective? 
A: I think not.  I think they make it fun, but not necessarily in any way that would actually make it more effective 
from the standpoint of achieving what a good ad is intended to achieve. 
Q: Was it you [sic] opinion that the words “Don” and “Don’s henley” add no value at all to the ad? 
A: That’s my basic opinion. 
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created with those letters, are the focus of the ad.  No reasonable jury could conclude that the use 
of the word play was merely incidental to the advertisement. 
 
2.  Can the Plaintiff be Identified from the Publication? 
 
The second element Plaintiff must satisfy to prove an infringement of the Right of Publicity, is 
that “plaintiff as a human being must be ‘identifiable’ from the total context of the defendant’s 
use.”  While there are many ways a plaintiff can be identified in a defendant’s use, the most 
obvious is use of a name that distinguishes the plaintiff.  “Identifiability of plaintiff will probably 
not be a disputable issue in the majority of meritorious Right of Publicity cases.”  This is due to 
the fact that defendants will usually make the plaintiff’s identity as identifiable as possible so as 
to draw the maximum amount of attention to the defendant’s product.  “The intent, state of mind 
and degree of knowledge of a defendant may shed light on the identifiability issue.”  “To 
establish liability, plaintiff need prove no more than that he or she is reasonably identifiable in 
defendant’s use to more than a de [minimis] number of persons.” . . .  
 
The Court finds that the issue of identifiability is indisputable in this case because Defendant has 
offered no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff is not identifiable from the ad.  Plaintiff’s survey 
evidence indicates that sixty-five percent of survey respondents believed there was a 
spokesperson or endorser in the ad.  Of those who said there was a spokesperson or endorser, 
twenty-three percent said the spokesperson or endorser was Don Henley.8  In other words, fifteen 
percent of those asked believed Don Henley was a spokesman for or endorser of the ad, and thus, 
necessarily identified him from the ad.  The results of this survey clearly prove that Don Henley 
was reasonably identifiable in Defendant’s ad to more than a de [minimis] number of persons. 
 
Further, in evaluating the intent and state of mind of Defendant, the evidence is undisputed that 
Defendant intended to appropriate Don Henley’s identity and intended that consumers associate 
the ad with Don Henley.  First, as stated supra, the creators of the ad admitted they intended 
consumers to associate Don Henley with the ad.  Second, the Defendant intended to appropriate 
the image of performing artist Don Henley, not some other, anonymous person by that same 
name.  This is proven by Plaintiff’s evidence that the ad creators drafted an earlier version of the 
ad that added quotes or paraphrases from eight Don Henley song titles to the ad at issue.9  The 
Court concludes that there is no fact issue from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Plaintiff was not identifiable from the ad. 
 
                                                 
8 It is arguable that, had the respondents been shown Defendant’s ad and been asked “Who do you think is identified 
in this ad?” a different result would have occurred.  In order to name Don Henley as the spokesperson or endorser of 
the ad (as the question was asked by the surveyor), the surveyees were required to believe the ad was, in fact, 
endorsed by Henley.  Had the surveyees been asked the question “Who do you think is identified in this ad?” it is 
likely that the number responding “Don Henley” would have increased due to the fact that they would not have been 
required to believe he endorsed the product or gave his permission to have his name or likeness used in the ad.  They 
would only have been required to believe he was identifiable from the ad. 
9 The ad, in draft form read, “If all you want to do is dance / pick up your witchy woman / take it to the limit in our 
cotton henley.  We promise, you’ve spent your last worthless evening!  Give her the best of your love, and when the 
party’s over, toss our machine washable henley right in the dirty laundry.  In the long run, you’ll love the great 
colors and the super-sturdy construction.  But hurry in, they may be already gone.” [Editor’s note: we underlined the 
song titles, which are a mixture of Eagles songs and Don Henley solo songs.] 
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3.  Was there an Advantage or Benefit to Defendant? 
 
Defendant insists that Plaintiff cannot prove a benefit inured to Dillard because the sales 
generated by the ad were not sufficient to cover the costs of running the ad.  Plaintiff argues that 
the Court need consider no more than the fact that the ad was created with the belief that the use 
of the words “Don’s henley” would help sell its product. 
 
. . . Comment d [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C] reads: “It is only when the publicity 
is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values 
associated with the name or likeness that the right of privacy is invaded.”  Comment d further 
suggests that the notion that a benefit must inure to the defendant is intertwined with the factor 
requiring that the plaintiff prove the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or likeness for its 
value and not for an incidental use.  The “benefit” element requires Plaintiff to prove that 
Defendant derived some commercial benefit from the use of plaintiff’s name or likeness as 
opposed to deriving no commercial benefit due to the fact that the use was incidental. . . .  
 
The plaintiff in a right to publicity action is not required to show that the defendant made money 
off the commercial use of the name or likeness, as Defendant suggests.  It is immaterial that 
Defendant made little profit after the ad ran, only ran the advertisement once, and received no 
feedback on the ad.  What Plaintiff must prove is that Defendant received a commercial benefit 
from use of Plaintiff’s name or likeness that, without Plaintiff’s image, he would not otherwise 
have received.  Defendant’s sophisticated and experienced ad creators described the benefit they 
received as being able to catch the eye of the consumer and make the ad more interesting.  By 
appropriating Plaintiff’s name or likeness, Defendant received the benefit of a celebrity 
endorsement without asking permission or paying a fee. 
 
To reiterate an earlier point, the Right of Publicity cause of action exists to protect a celebrity’s 
identity, which can be valuable in the promotion of products.  Such celebrities have an exclusive 
legal right to control and profit from the commercial use of their name, personality and identity. . . . 
The Court, thus, refuses to require a plaintiff to prove that a defendant made a profit or secured a 
tangible benefit from use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness. 
 
. . . Defendant should not be shielded from liability because “the product promoted is 
undesirable, the ad [is] clumsy or somehow ineffective, or sales slump[ed] during the relevant 
time period.”  Rather, Dillard should be held liable because it received a benefit by getting to use 
a celebrity’s name for free in its advertising.  Whether or not the advertising worked for Dillard 
is wholly irrelevant.  The Court concludes that there is no fact issue from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that Defendant did not receive a benefit from its use of Plaintiff’s likeness. . . . 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Celebrities v. Ordinary People.  This case emphasizes Don Henley’s celebrity status.  However, 
as cases such as the Cohen case discussed later illustrate, celebrity status is not required for a 
valid publicity rights claim. 
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Variations.  Would the result have changed if Dillard had referenced “Donald’s henley”?  
“Dawn’s henley”?  “Don Juan’s henley”?  Once the court believed that Dillard was trying to 
evoke Don Henley, was Dillard liable no matter what variation of “Don Henley” they used?  The 
ad derives value from the pun on Henley’s name, but the court doesn’t seem interested in the fact 
that it required extra mental effort for consumers to decode the pun. 
 
Consumer Survey.  The case says “fifteen percent of those asked believed Don Henley was a 
spokesman for or endorser of the ad.”  Does the result change if all of the other 85% clearly 
understood that the ad was a joke?  Does this case suggest that the perceptions of a small 
minority of consumers can veto advertising that the majority understand as a joke? 
 
Consumer surveys are common in trademark and false advertising cases, but they are relatively 
rare in publicity rights cases. 
 
Celebrities on a First-name Basis.  During the 2010 Super Bowl, the online brokerage E-Trade 
ran one of its “talking baby” commercials.  In the commercial, the protagonist is explaining to 
his “girlfriend” (a baby girl) that he didn’t call because he was taking advantage of E-trade.  The 
girlfriend accusatorily asks, “And that milkaholic Lindsay wasn’t over?”  After an awkward 
pause, the protagonist then replies “Lindsay?” in an unsure voice while a previously unseen baby 
girl in the protagonist’s room—presumably, the “Lindsay” both babies are referencing—reveals 
herself to the camera and says “Milk-a-what?” 
 
This ad prompted a $50 million lawsuit from Lindsay Lohan, a once-successful actress who 
battled highly publicized substance-addiction issues.  Lohan v. E*Trade Securities LLC, No. 10-
004579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. complaint filed March 8, 2010).  Lohan claimed that the ad’s “Lindsay” 
references were meant to be her.  Among other things, she claimed that her first name is so well-
known that ad viewers would have assumed it was her. 
 
If you represented Lohan, what evidence would you try to introduce to show that “Lindsay” 
referenced your client? 
 
Lohan was born in 1986.  In the 1980s, “Lindsay” was the 44th most popular girl name 
according to the Baby NameVoyager (and the sound-alike “Lindsey” was the 42nd most 
popular).  In 2008, “Lindsay” was the 380th most popular girl’s name.  Is either fact relevant? 
 
Would it matter if the first draft of the commercial referred to the Lindsay character as 
“Deborah”?  Or does every first name have the possibility of some celebrity with the same name 
claiming the ad refers to him or her? 
 
Lohan and E*Trade subsequently settled the lawsuit on confidential terms. 
 
Consider some other examples of one-name invocations.  Does the following billboard 
misappropriate anyone’s personality rights? 
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How about a New Orleans billboard for local favorite Zatarain’s Fish-Fri with the tagline “AS 
SEEN ON OKRA”?  
 
How about the following ad and product name?  Elroy Hirsch was a University of Wisconsin 
athlete who went on to become a successful and well-known pro football player.  Hirsch got the 
nickname “Crazylegs” as described in Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son. Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 
(Wis. 1979): 
 
In the fourth game of his first season of play at Wisconsin, he acquired the name, 
“Crazylegs.”  In that game, Hirsch ran 62 yards for a touchdown, wobbling down 
the sideline looking as though he might step out of bounds at any moment.  
Hirsch’s unique running style, which looked something like a whirling eggbeater, 
drew the attention of a sportswriter for the Chicago Daily News who tagged 
Hirsch with the nickname, “Crazylegs.”  It is undisputed that the name stuck, and 
Hirsch has been known as “Crazylegs” ever since. 
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The court upheld Hirsch’s claim against the product name.  Are you surprised by that result?  
Why or why not? 
 
Is there any situation where a depiction of a celebrity wouldn’t qualify as a benefit to the 
advertiser?  Consider this case: 
 
 
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) 
 
Former basketball star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar appeals the district court’s summary judgment in 
favor of General Motors Corporation (“GMC”) and its advertising agency, Leo Burnett Co., in 
his action alleging violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and California’s statutory 
and common law right of publicity.  Abdul-Jabbar argues that GMC violated his trademark and 
publicity rights by using his former name, Lew Alcindor, without his consent, in a television 
commercial aired during the 1993 NCAA men’s basketball tournament.  The district court based 
its judgment on all causes of action largely on its findings that Abdul-Jabbar had abandoned the 
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name “Lew Alcindor,” and that GMC’s use of the name could not be construed as an 
endorsement of its product by Abdul-Jabbar.  Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
we reverse and remand for trial. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This dispute concerns a GMC television commercial aired during the 1993 NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament.  The record includes a videotape of the spot, which plays as follows: A 
disembodied voice asks, “How ‘bout some trivia?”  This question is followed by the appearance 
of a screen bearing the printed words, “You’re Talking to the Champ.”  The voice then asks, 
“Who holds the record for being voted the most outstanding player of this tournament?”  In the 
screen appear the printed words, “Lew Alcindor, UCLA, ‘67, ‘68, ‘69.”  Next, the voice asks, 
“Has any car made the ‘Consumer Digest’s Best Buy’ list more than once?  [and responds:] The 
Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight has.”  A seven-second film clip of the automobile, with its price, 
follows.  During the clip, the voice says, “In fact, it’s made that list three years in a row.  And 
now you can get this Eighty-Eight special edition for just $18,995.”  At the end of the clip, a 
message appears in print on the screen: “A Definite First Round Pick,” accompanied by the voice 
saying, “it’s your money.”  A final printed message appears: “Demand Better, 88 by 
Oldsmobile.” 
 
The following facts are undisputed.  Kareem Abdul-Jabbar was named Ferdinand Lewis (“Lew”) 
Alcindor at birth, and played basketball under that name throughout his college career and into 
his early years in the National Basketball Association (“NBA”).  While in college, he converted 
to Islam and began to use the Muslim name “Kareem Abdul-Jabbar” among friends.  Several 
years later, in 1971, he opted to record the name “Kareem Abdul-Jabbar” under an Illinois name 
recordation statute, and thereafter played basketball and endorsed products under that name.  He 
has not used the name “Lew Alcindor” for commercial purposes in over ten years. 
 
GMC did not obtain Abdul-Jabbar’s consent, nor did it pay him, to use his former name in the 
commercial described above.  When Abdul-Jabbar complained to GMC about the commercial, 
the company promptly withdrew the ad.  The ad aired about five or six times in March 1993 
prior to its withdrawal.  The parties dispute whether Abdul-Jabbar abandoned the name Lew 
Alcindor and whether the ad could be construed as an endorsement by Abdul-Jabbar of the 88 
Oldsmobile. . . . 
 
ANALYSIS . . . 
 
State law claims: Common Law and Statutory Rights of Privacy 
 
“California has long recognized a common law right of privacy . . . [which includes protection 
against] appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”  The 
right to be protected against such appropriations is also referred to as the “right of publicity.”  
 
The so-called right of publicity means in essence that the reaction of the public to 
name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed and 
planned, endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially 
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exploitable opportunities.  The protection of name and likeness from unwarranted 
intrusion or exploitation is the heart of the law of privacy. 
 
[A] common law cause of action for appropriation of name or likeness may be pleaded by 
alleging “(1) the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name 
or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) 
resulting injury.” 
 
. . . California’s common law “right of publicity is not limited to the appropriation of name or 
likeness.”  The key issue is appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity. 
 
It is not important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but 
whether the defendant has done so. . . . A rule which says that the right of 
publicity can be infringed only through the use of nine different methods of 
appropriating identity merely challenges the clever advertising strategist to come 
up with the tenth. 
 
California’s common law cause of action is complemented legislatively by Civil Code section 
3344.  [T]he statute is best understood as “complementing,” rather than enacting, the common 
law cause of action, because the two are not identical. . . . 
 
In addition to the common law elements, the statute requires two further allegations: 1) knowing 
use; and 2) a “direct connection . . . between the use and the commercial purpose.”  Furthermore, 
unlike the common law cause of action, section 3344 is apparently limited to commercial 
appropriations. . . . ”  California law has not imposed any requirement that the unauthorized use 
or publication of a person’s name or picture be suggestive of an endorsement or association with 
the injured person.”  This caveat apparently applies to both the common law and statutory causes 
of action. 
 
We have construed the statute’s protection of “name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness” 
more narrowly than the common law’s protection of “identity.” 
 
The district court ruled that GMC was entitled to summary judgment on both the statutory and 
common law causes of action.  The court reasoned that section 3344 did not apply because: 1) 
Abdul-Jabbar had abandoned his former name; and 2) GMC did not “use” plaintiff’s name 
because Abdul-Jabbar “did not [at the time of the ad] and does not have the name used.”  While 
the court found that GMC knowingly used the name Lew Alcindor for commercial purposes 
without obtaining plaintiff’s consent, it concluded that GMC had not used plaintiff’s name 
because he no longer bore that name. 
 
The district court found that Abdul-Jabbar abandoned the name Lew Alcindor when he legally 
recorded his present name in 1971.  The court acknowledged that “[w]e have no case law in 
California that abandonment is a defense [to § 3344], but as I would construe the law, it surely 
must be.”  The court further found, “regardless of abandonment,” that because Abdul-Jabbar no 
longer uses the name Lew Alcindor, “there has been no use of plaintiff’s name.”  Extrapolating 
from our holdings . . . that, under section 3344, “use must be of actual voice or actual likeness,” 
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the court concluded that “the actual name must be used in a name case, and . . . our case does not 
involve the use of plaintiff’s actual name.” . . .  
 
We hold that Abdul-Jabbar has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under both California 
common law and section 3344.  The statute’s reference to “name or likeness” is not limited to 
present or current use.  To the extent GMC’s use of the plaintiff’s birth name attracted television 
viewers’ attention, GMC gained a commercial advantage.  Whether or not Lew Alcindor 
“equals” Kareem Abdul-Jabbar in the sense that “‘Here’s Johnny’ equal[led] Johnny Carson,” or 
“‘the greatest’ equal[led] Muhammed Ali”—or the glamorously dressed robot equalled Vanna 
White—is a question for the jury. 
 
As to injury, the district court opined that any “loss injury” was “de minimis,” though it 
explicitly declined to rely on this in granting GMC summary judgment.  White does not 
explicitly discuss injury, but notes that “the law protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit th[e] 
value” of her fame.  Abdul-Jabbar alleges, and submits evidence to show, that he was injured 
economically because the ad will make it difficult for him to endorse other automobiles, and 
emotionally because people may be led to believe he has abandoned his current name and 
assume he has renounced his religion.  These allegations suffice to support his action.  Injury to a 
plaintiff’s right of publicity is not limited to present or future economic loss, but “may induce 
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress.” . . .  
 
While Lew Alcindor’s basketball record may be said to be “newsworthy,” its use is not 
automatically privileged.  GMC used the information in the context of an automobile 
advertisement, not in a news or sports account.  Hence GMC is not protected by section 
3344(d). . . . 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Abandonment via Name-change.  This case addresses a celebrity name-change when the 
“abandoned” name was also well-known, a relatively unusual circumstance.  A more likely 
scenario is the celebrity’s adoption of a new stage name that becomes more well-known than his 
or her birth name.  For example, the real name of 50 Cent is Curtis Jackson.  If ad copy 
referenced Curtis Jackson, would that violate his publicity rights even if only a very small 
percentage of the audience would realize that is the same person as 50 Cent?  In the case of post-
mortem publicity rights, some statutes require the individual to have commercialized his or her 
name before death as a precondition of descendibility. 
 
References to Celebrities in Ad Copies.  Why isn’t it okay that GM merely recited a true fact that 
Alcindor was the NCAA tournament MVP three times?  What changes, if any, could GM make 
to its ad copy to reference Lew Alcindor and not violate his publicity rights?  Does this case 
imply that no changes would have satisfied the court, i.e., that merely mentioning Alcindor in the 
ad copy is a per se publicity rights violation?   
 
In the discussion about GM’s trademark liability and the possibility of a nominative use defense, 
the court says: 
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Had GMC limited itself to the “trivia” portion of its ad, GMC could likely defend 
the reference to Lew Alcindor as a nominative fair use.  But by using Alcindor’s 
record to make a claim for its car—like the basketball star, the Olds 88 won an 
“award” three years in a row, and like the star, the car is a “champ” and a “first 
round pick”—GMC has arguably attempted to “appropriate the cachet of one 
product for another,” if not also to “capitalize on consumer confusion.”  We 
therefore hold that there is a question of fact as to whether GMC is entitled to a 
fair use defense. 
 
This seems to suggest that GM could have referenced Alcindor if it did not try to connect 
Alcindor’s accomplishments to its product claims.  But if GM doesn’t make that cognitive 
connection for the viewer, why would GM invoke Alcindor’s accomplishments?  Worse, it might 
be even more suspicious if GM invoked Alcindor’s accomplishments without tying them to 
product claims; otherwise, it might look even more like an implied endorsement from 
Alcindor/Abdul-Jabbar.  Given that GM is potentially in trouble either way, does this support the 
inference that GM could not revamp the ad copy to reference Alcindor? 
 
In the modern era of product placement and integrated advertising—where, for example, an 
advertiser whose products are featured on 30 Rock may also run conventional ads on the show—
what kind of juxtapositions will suffice to invoke the right of publicity?  Recall the Stewart v. 
Rolling Stone discussed in Chapter 2.  The excerpted opinion focused on Rolling Stone’s 
liability, but think about it from the perspective of Camel as the advertiser.  Do you think Camel 
used the musicians’ identities for its commercial advantage? 
 
Publicity rights can apply to other types of commercial speech beyond traditional ads.  Recall 
Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC from Chapter 2, which held that a Cingular press release 
touting its disaster preparedness equipment called MACH 1 and MACH 2 and invoking 
legendary pilot Chuck Yeager’s accomplishment of flying at Mach 1 speed could violate 
Yeager’s publicity rights. 
 
Ad Agency Liability.  The court treated the advertiser (GM) and its ad agency (Leo Burnett) as 
equally liable for the publicity rights violation.  For more on this, see Chapter 15, Sec. 1. 
 
False Endorsement.  Abdul-Jabbar asserted a Lanham Act false endorsement claim in addition to 
his publicity rights claim.  GM defended on trademark abandonment and nominative use 
grounds.  The Ninth Circuit held that it was impossible to abandon a prior personal name.  The 
court also held that triable issues remained on the nominative use defense—specifically, the third 
factor requiring that the secondary user not create an implied sponsorship or endorsement. 
 
Personality Trademarks and Publicity Rights Compared.  In some cases, individuals may have 
protectable trademarks in addition to their publicity rights.  Recall that getting a trademark 
requires making a “use in commerce” of the term, such as by affixing a person’s name or 
likeness on goods or services available in the marketplace.  Furthermore, to get a trademark in a 
personal name, the individual has to show that their name has achieved secondary meaning, i.e., 
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that when consumers see the name, they think of a single source of marketplace goods or 
services. 
 
As a result of these requirements, it will be rare for non-celebrities to have trademark rights 
protecting some aspect of their personality.  Even most celebrities will not have protectable 
trademark rights, either because they have not merchandized their personality or have not 
achieved the requisite secondary meaning. 
 
Furthermore, even when celebrities have trademark rights in their personalities, publicity rights 
claims are usually easier to win (unless they are in a jurisdiction which has not clearly 
recognized publicity rights at all) because publicity rights do not require showing a likelihood of 
consumer confusion about product source.  Also, as the Henley and Abdul-Jabbar cases indicate, 
courts will often apply publicity rights doctrines broadly, while they may be reluctant to expand 
trademark doctrine so freely. 
 
Nevertheless, if they are eligible for trademark protection, celebrities may find value in securing 
federal trademark registration to complement their publicity rights.  For example, federal 
trademark registration ensures access to federal courts (rather than state courts) and consistent 
minimum rights across all jurisdictions.  Also, trademark registrations can improve standing for 
certain types of actions, such as counterfeiting claims or domain-name enforcement actions. 
 
Keyword Advertising on Names.  Assume that an advertiser purchases a person’s name as the 
trigger for its keyword advertising, i.e., when searchers use the search query “Joe Smith,” the 
advertisement displays.  Assume the plaintiff does not have any trademark rights in his or her 
name.  Does the purchase of the keyword advertising trigger violate the person’s publicity or 
privacy rights?  Does it matter if the ad copy references the name?  See Habush v. Cannon, 2012 
WL 2345137 (Wis. App. Ct. 2012).  In 2010, Google used to say, “Don’t use proper names as 
keywords.  Sites that promote people-finder services, detective agencies, or other similar services 
are not permitted to use proper names in ad text or as keywords.”  In 2012, it simply says “We do 
not monitor the use of proper names in AdWords ads or keywords.” 
 
B. A Person’s Voice 
 
California’s publicity rights statute expressly protects the use of a person’s voice in ad copy.  
However, does that prevent an advertiser from using a “sound-alike”? 
 
 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) 
 
This case centers on the protectibility [sic] of the voice of a celebrated chanteuse from 
commercial exploitation without her consent.  Ford Motor Company and its advertising agency, 
Young & Rubicam, Inc., in 1985 advertised the Ford Lincoln Mercury with a series of nineteen 
30 or 60 second television commercials in what the agency called “The Yuppie Campaign.”  The 
aim was to make an emotional connection with Yuppies,* bringing back memories of when they 
were in college.  Different popular songs of the seventies were sung on each commercial.  The 
                                                 
* [Ed. note: “Yuppie” is an acronym for “Young Urban Professional,” an affluent segment of the Baby Boomers.] 
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agency tried to get “the original people,” that is, the singers who had popularized the songs, to 
sing them.  Failing in that endeavor in ten cases the agency had the songs sung by “sound-
alikes.”  Bette Midler, the plaintiff and appellant here, was done by a sound-alike. 
 
Midler is a nationally known actress and singer.  She won a Grammy as early as 1973 as the Best 
New Artist of that year.  Records made by her since then have gone Platinum and Gold.  She was 
nominated in 1979 for an Academy award for Best Female Actress in The Rose, in which she 
portrayed a pop singer.  Newsweek in its June 30, 1986 issue described her as an “outrageously 
original singer/comedian.”  Time hailed her in its March 2, 1987 issue as “a legend” and “the 
most dynamic and poignant singer-actress of her time.” 
 
When Young & Rubicam was preparing the Yuppie Campaign it presented the commercial to its 
client by playing an edited version of Midler singing “Do You Want To Dance,” taken from the 
1973 Midler album, “The Divine Miss M.”  After the client accepted the idea and form of the 
commercial, the agency contacted Midler’s manager, Jerry Edelstein.  The conversation went as 
follows: “Hello, I am Craig Hazen from Young and Rubicam.  I am calling you to find out if 
Bette Midler would be interested in doing . . . ?  Edelstein: “Is it a commercial?”  “Yes.”  “We 
are not interested.” 
 
Undeterred, Young & Rubicam sought out Ula Hedwig whom it knew to have been one of “the 
Harlettes” a backup singer for Midler for ten years.  Hedwig was told by Young & Rubicam that 
“they wanted someone who could sound like Bette Midler’s recording of [Do You Want To 
Dance].”  She was asked to make a “demo” tape of the song if she was interested.  She made an a 
capella demo and got the job. 
 
At the direction of Young & Rubicam, Hedwig then made a record for the commercial.  The 
Midler record of “Do You Want To Dance” was first played to her.  She was told to “sound as 
much as possible like the Bette Midler record,” leaving out only a few “aahs” unsuitable for the 
commercial.  Hedwig imitated Midler to the best of her ability. 
 
After the commercial was aired Midler was told by “a number of people” that it “sounded 
exactly” like her record of “Do You Want To Dance.”  Hedwig was told by “many personal 
friends” that they thought it was Midler singing the commercial.  Ken Fritz, a personal manager 
in the entertainment business not associated with Midler, declares by affidavit that he heard the 
commercial on more than one occasion and thought Midler was doing the singing. 
 
Neither the name nor the picture of Midler was used in the commercial; Young & Rubicam had a 
license from the copyright holder to use the song.  At issue in this case is only the protection of 
Midler’s voice.  The district court described the defendants’ conduct as that “of the average 
thief.”  They decided, “If we can’t buy it, we’ll take it.”  The court nonetheless believed there 
was no legal principle preventing imitation of Midler’s voice and so gave summary judgment for 
the defendants.  Midler appeals. . . . 
 
California Civil Code section 3344 is also of no aid to Midler.  The statute affords damages to a 
person injured by another who uses the person’s “name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness, 
in any manner.”  The defendants did not use Midler’s name or anything else whose use is 
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prohibited by the statute.  The voice they used was Hedwig’s, not hers.  The term “likeness” 
refers to a visual image not a vocal imitation.  The statute, however, does not preclude Midler 
from pursuing any cause of action she may have at common law; the statute itself implies that 
such common law causes of action do exist because it says its remedies are merely “cumulative.” 
 
The companion statute protecting the use of a deceased person’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph or likeness states that the rights it recognizes are “property rights.”  By analogy the 
common law rights are also property rights.  Appropriation of such common law rights is a tort 
in California. . . .  
 
Why did the defendants ask Midler to sing if her voice was not of value to them?  Why did they 
studiously acquire the services of a sound-alike and instruct her to imitate Midler if Midler’s 
voice was not of value to them?  What they sought was an attribute of Midler’s identity.  Its 
value was what the market would have paid for Midler to have sung the commercial in person. 
 
. . . A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face.  The human voice is one of the most palpable 
ways identity is manifested.  We are all aware that a friend is at once known by a few words on 
the phone.  At a philosophical level it has been observed that with the sound of a voice, “the 
other stands before me.”  A fortiori, these observations hold true of singing, especially singing by 
a singer of renown.  The singer manifests herself in the song.  To impersonate her voice is to 
pirate her identity.  
 
We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to advertise 
merchandise is actionable.  We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is 
widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated 
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California.  Midler has made a showing, sufficient 
to defeat summary judgment, that the defendants here for their own profit in selling their product 
did appropriate part of her identity. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Why Copyright Wasn’t an Issue.  Bobby Freeman wrote the song “Do You Wanna Dance?” and 
recorded it in 1958.  A 1965 cover version by the Beach Boys is perhaps the best known version.  
Midler herself covered the song, with a jazzier and much slower arrangement, under the title “Do 
You Want To Dance?” in 1973.  Therefore, Midler did not own the copyright to the song, and 
her permission was not required for Ford to perform the copyrighted song in the advertisement.  
Because Ford did not use the actual 1973 recording either, it did not need a copyright license for 
the recording. 
 
Damages.  On remand, a jury awarded Midler $400,000 from Ford’s ad agency Young & 
Rubicam (Ford had already exited the case).  Midler had asked for damages of $10 million.  How 
should damages be computed in a sound-alike case? 
 
Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), a sound-alike case involving raspy-
voiced singer Tom Waits and a radio advertisement for “SalsaRio Doritos,” explores that 
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question.  The jury awarded $2.6 million in compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys’ 
fees against the manufacturer Frito-Lay and its advertising agency Tracy-Locke.  The defendants 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
 
The jury awarded Waits the following compensatory damages for voice 
misappropriation: $100,000 for the fair market value of his services; $200,000 for 
injury to his peace, happiness and feelings; and $75,000 for injury to his goodwill, 
professional standing and future publicity value.  The defendants contest the latter 
two awards, disputing both the availability of such damages in a voice 
misappropriation action and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
awards. 
 
1.  Injury to Peace, Happiness and Feelings 
 
The defendants argue that in right of publicity actions, only damages to 
compensate for economic injury are available.  We disagree.  Although the injury 
stemming from violation of the right of publicity “may be largely, or even wholly, 
of an economic or material nature,” we have recognized that “it is quite possible 
that the appropriation of the identity of a celebrity may induce humiliation, 
embarrassment, and mental distress.”  Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, 
Midler neither discussed nor limited the damages recoverable in a voice 
misappropriation action.  Midler makes reference to the market value of Midler’s 
voice solely to support its conclusion that her voice has economic value and, 
therefore, is a protectable property right.  
 
In assessing the propriety of mental distress damages, our focus is properly 
directed to the nature of the infringement and its embarrassing impact on the 
plaintiff.  Often the objectionable nature of the use will cause mental distress. . . . 
Given the evidence that the commercial use of his voice was particularly 
offensive to Waits, we conclude that Waits’ prayer for mental distress damages 
was properly submitted to the jury. 
 
The defendants argue, however, that merely taking offense is an insufficient basis 
for awarding mental distress damages, and that under California law the evidence 
was insufficient to support the award.  In California, mental distress damages may 
be recovered for “shame, humiliation, embarrassment, [and] anger.”  Waits 
testified that when he heard the Doritos commercial, “this corn chip sermon,” he 
was shocked and very angry.  These feelings “grew and grew over a period of a 
couple of days” because of his strong public opposition to doing commercials.  
Waits testified, “[I]t embarrassed me.  I had to call all my friends, that if they hear 
this thing, please be informed this is not me.  I was on the phone for days.  I also 
had people calling me saying, Gee, Tom, I heard the new Doritos ad.”  Added to 
this evidence of Waits’ shock, anger, and embarrassment is the strong inference 
that, because of his outspoken public stance against doing commercial 
endorsements, the Doritos commercial humiliated Waits by making him an 
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apparent hypocrite.  This evidence was sufficient both to allow the jury to 
consider mental distress damages and to support their eventual award. 
 
2.  Injury to Goodwill and Future Publicity Value 
 
The defendants next argue that reputational damages are available only in 
defamation actions and that since Waits did not allege or prove defamation, they 
were unavailable here.  Further, they argue, there was no evidence to support the 
award of such damages because Waits did not show that his career had suffered.  
Again, we reject these contentions. 
 
We have no doubt, in light of general tort liability principles, that where the 
misappropriation of identity causes injury to reputation, compensation for such 
injury is appropriate.  Reputational damages, moreover, have been awarded in 
right of publicity cases.  The central issue is not whether these damages were 
available, but whether the evidence was sufficient to establish injury to Waits’ 
reputation.  As we noted above, the jury could have inferred from the evidence 
that the commercial created a public impression that Waits was a hypocrite for 
endorsing Doritos.  Moreover, it also could have inferred damage to his artistic 
reputation, for Waits had testified that “part of my character and personality and 
image that I have cultivated is that I do not endorse products.”  Finally, from the 
testimony of Waits’ expert witness, the jury could have inferred that if Waits ever 
wanted to do a commercial in the future, the fee he could command would be 
lowered by $50,000 to $150,000 because of the Doritos commercial.  This 
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s award of $75,000 for injury to Waits’ 
goodwill and future publicity value. 
 
The court also upheld the jury’s punitive damages awards of $1.5 million against Tracy-
Locke and $500,000 against Frito-Lay, saying:  
 
A rational jury could have found the defendants’ conduct despicable because they 
knowingly impugned Waits’ integrity in the public eye.  A rational jury also could 
have found that the defendants, in spite of their awareness of Waits’ legal right to 
control the commercial use of his voice, acted in conscious disregard of that right 
by broadcasting the commercial. 
 
Asking Permission.  Businesspeople frequently believe that “it’s better to ask for forgiveness 
than permission.”  Are the Midler and Waits cases consistent with this maxim?  When you are a 
practicing lawyer, will you prospectively ask IP rightsholders for their consent in ambiguous 
situations, or do these opinions make you a little gun-shy? 
 
Singers Closely Identified with Famous Songs.  Assume that ad copy includes a performance of a 
properly licensed song sung by a non-sound-alike.  On publicity rights grounds, can a singer of 
that song nevertheless object to use of that song because the song is so closely identified with 
him or her?  The answer appears to be no.   
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Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) involved Goodyear’s radio 
and television ads promoting its “wide boots” tires.  The ad copy included portions of the song 
“These Boots Are Made For Walkin’,” a 1966 #1 hit for Nancy Sinatra (the daughter of Frank 
Sinatra).  The ad agency properly secured licenses to the song’s copyrights, owned by Criterion 
Music (not Sinatra).  Sinatra alleged, among other things, “that the song has been so popularized 
by the plaintiff that her name is identified with it; [and] that she is best known by her connection 
with the song.”  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that her lawsuit was preempted by 
copyright law. 
 
Oliveria v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2001) addresses a slightly different situation.  
Oliveria, who performs under the name “Astrud Gilberto,” sang the well-known 1964 recording 
of the song “The Girl from Ipanema.”  Frito-Lay obtained the proper copyright licenses to use 
that recording in a television ad for its baked potato chips.  Nevertheless, Oliveria claimed she 
had become known as the Girl from Ipanema due to the recording’s success and her many 
subsequent performances of the song.  The court rejected Oliveria’s trademark claim because she 
did not cite “a single precedent throughout the history of trademark supporting the notion that a 
performing artist acquires a trademark or service mark signifying herself in a recording of her 
own famous performance.”  The court said that Oliveria’s state law claims could be refiled in 
state court, but Oliveria never did so. 
 
If a performing artist had a cause of action for being closely identified with a song, what would 
that mean for other artists who cover the same song—which, in the case of “These Boots are 
Made for Walkin’,” includes Jessica Simpson and the band Megadeth? 
 
C. A Person’s Image 
 
Showing a person in ad copy is usually squarely covered by the person’s publicity/privacy rights.  
It might also constitute an endorsement or testimonial, which is discussed later in this chapter.  
California’s statute also protects against the use of “likenesses,” which probably refers to 
drawings of people instead of photos or videos of them. 
 
To get around this general rule, some advertisers have hired lookalike actors to portray famous 
celebrities.  As with the sound-alike cases, courts generally have rejected this work-around. 
 
For example, Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), involved an ad 
depicting a lookalike of the famous director and actor Woody Allen: 
 
The present action arises from an advertisement, placed by National to promote 
its nationally franchised video rental chain, containing a photograph of defendant 
Boroff taken on September 2, 1983.  The photograph portrays a customer in a 
National Video store, an individual in his forties, with a high forehead, tousled 
hair, and heavy black glasses.  The customer’s elbow is on the counter, and his 
face, bearing an expression at once quizzical and somewhat smug, is leaning on 
his hand.  It is not disputed that, in general, the physical features and pose are 
characteristic of plaintiff. 
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The staging of the photograph also evokes associations with plaintiff.  Sitting on 
the counter are videotape cassettes of “Annie Hall” and “Bananas,” two of 
plaintiff’s best known films, as well as “Casablanca” and “The Maltese Falcon.”  
The latter two are Humphrey Bogart films of the 1940’s associated with plaintiff 
primarily because of his play and film “Play It Again, Sam,” in which the spirit of 
Bogart appears to the character played by Allen and offers him romantic advice.  
In addition, the title “Play It Again, Sam” is a famous, although inaccurate, 
quotation from “Casablanca.” 
 
The individual in the advertisement is holding up a National Video V.I.P. Card, 
which apparently entitles the bearer to favorable terms on movie rentals.  The 
woman behind the counter is smiling at the customer and appears to be gasping in 
exaggerated excitement at the presence of a celebrity. 
 
 
 
The photograph was used in an advertisement which appeared in the March 1984 
issue of “Video Review,” a magazine published in New York and distributed in 
the Southern District, and in the April 1984 issue of “Take One,” an in-house 
publication which National distributes to its franchisees across the country.  The 
headline on the advertisement reads “Become a V.I.P. at National Video.  We’ll 
Make You Feel Like a Star.”  The copy goes on to explain that holders of the 
V.I.P. card receive “hassle-free movie renting” and “special savings” and 
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concludes that “you don’t need a famous face to be treated to some pretty famous 
service.” 
 
The same photograph and headline were also used on countercards distributed to 
National’s franchisees.  Although the advertisement that ran in “Video Review” 
contained a disclaimer in small print reading “Celebrity double provided by Ron 
Smith’s Celebrity Look-Alike’s, Los Angeles, Calif.,” no such disclaimer 
appeared in the other versions of the advertisement. 
 
The defendants explained the lookalike’s appearance in the ad copy this way: 
 
Although defendants concede that they sought to evoke by reference plaintiff’s 
general persona, they strenuously deny that they intended to imply that the person 
in the photograph was actually plaintiff or that plaintiff endorsed National.  
Defendants offer their own interpretation of the advertisement to support their 
assertion that the photograph does not depict plaintiff.  According to defendants, 
the idea of the advertisement is that even people who are not stars are treated like 
stars at National Video.  They insist that the advertisement depicts a “Woody 
Allen fan,” so dedicated that he has adopted his idol’s appearance and 
mannerisms, who is able to live out his fantasy by receiving star treatment at 
National Video.  The knowing viewer is supposed to be amused that the counter 
person actually believes that the customer is Woody Allen. 
 
Do you find that explanation credible? 
 
Allen ultimately succeeded on his trademark claim of likely confusion over endorsement, and the 
court did not definitively resolve his publicity/privacy rights claims because the New York 
statute covered only a portrait or picture, and the court was unsure that a lookalike could count as 
a portrait or picture.  However, the court’s discussion of those claims is nevertheless useful: 
 
The beginning of modern privacy law is generally charted from the publication of 
the famous Warren and [Brandeis] article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890).  Although most states, in the decades since, have recognized at least 
four different categories of invasion of privacy, New York has never recognized 
the right to privacy as part of its common law.  Arrington v. New York Times 
Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 439-40 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983). 
 
Arrington reaffirms the rule first established in Roberson v. Rochester Folding 
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).  The New York Court of Appeals 
therein rejected an argument, based on the Warren and Brandeis article, that New 
York should recognize the branch of privacy law which has come to be known as 
misappropriation of another’s name or likeness.  Plaintiff Roberson sought to 
recover for the humiliation she felt when she discovered that some 25,000 copies 
of her portrait had been distributed throughout the country without her consent as 
part of an advertisement for flour.  The court held that no precedent supported 
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plaintiff’s argument, that recognition of such a common law right would result in 
endless litigation, and that only the legislature could create this new right. 
 
In response to public outcry over the outcome of Roberson, the New York 
legislature passed sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law in 1903.  In its 
present form the statute provides that 
 
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or 
for purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living 
person without having first obtained the written consent of such 
person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
Section 51 provides in addition that 
 
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the state 
for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade without the 
written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an 
equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the 
person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, 
to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and 
recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use 
and if defendant shall have knowingly used such person’s name, 
portrait or picture in such a manner as is forbidden or declared to 
be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its discretion, may 
award exemplary damages. . . . 
 
The right to privacy recognized by the Civil Rights law has been strictly 
construed, both because it is in derogation of New York common law and because 
of potential conflict with the First Amendment, particularly where public figures 
are involved.  To make out a violation, a plaintiff must satisfy three distinct 
elements: 1) use of his or her name, portrait, or picture, 2) for commercial or trade 
purposes, 3) without written permission.  Merely suggesting certain 
characteristics of the plaintiff, without literally using his or her name, portrait, or 
picture, is not actionable under the statute.  Plaintiff here must therefore 
demonstrate, inter alia, that the advertisement in question appropriates his 
“portrait or picture.” 
 
In addition to the statutory right to privacy, plaintiff in this case argues that 
defendants have violated his “right of publicity,” an analogous right recognized in 
the common law of many jurisdictions.  Indeed, until recently, some federal 
courts assumed that the New York courts would recognize such a common law 
right independent of that protected by the Civil Rights Law.  The elements of the 
cause of action were deemed to be essentially the same as those provided in the 
privacy statute, with the additional requirement that the plaintiff have developed a 
property interest with a monetary value in his or her name or face.  Unlike the 
Civil Rights Law provision, which is primarily designed to compensate for the 
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hurt feelings of private people who find their identities usurped for another’s 
commercial gain, the right of publicity protects this property interest of the 
celebrity in his or her public identity.  It is primarily this interest which Woody 
Allen seeks to vindicate in the case at bar. 
 
The New York Court of Appeals, however, recently has held that no separate 
common law cause of action to vindicate the right of publicity exists in New 
York.  Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (1984).  The 
court held, in essence, that the “right of publicity” was merely a misnomer for the 
privacy interest protected by the Civil Rights Law, as applied to public figures. 
 
By its terms, the statute applies to any use of a person’s picture or 
portrait for advertising or trade purposes whenever the defendant 
has not obtained the person’s written consent to do so. . . . Since 
the “right of publicity” is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law 
as an aspect of the right of privacy, which, as noted, is exclusively 
statutory in this state, the plaintiff cannot claim an independent 
common law right of publicity. . . .  
 
. . . In examining the undisputed facts of this case with reference to plaintiff’s 
summary judgment motion, it is immediately clear that two of the three prongs of 
the Civil Rights Law are satisfied.  First, there is no question that the photograph 
said to be of plaintiff was used for commercial purposes, since it appeared in a 
magazine advertisement soliciting business for National Video franchisees.  
Second, defendants do not dispute that plaintiff never gave his consent to the use 
of the photograph, either orally or in writing.  It therefore appears that the only 
element of plaintiff’s case over which there is any serious dispute is whether the 
photograph is a “portrait or picture” of plaintiff. 
 
Plaintiff argues that Boroff’s physical resemblance to him, when viewed in 
conjunction with the undeniable attempt to evoke plaintiff’s image through the 
selection of props and poses, makes the photograph in question a “portrait or 
picture” of plaintiff as a matter of law.  Plaintiff notes that it is not necessary that 
all persons seeing the photograph actually identify him, only that he be 
identifiable from the photograph.  Plaintiff contends that it is beyond cavil that 
some people will recognize him in this photograph.  The cited cases, however, 
involved photographs which were not disputed to be of the plaintiffs; the only 
question was whether the pictures were too old or too obscure to be recognizable.  
They do not help us answer the more basic question of whether the photograph in 
the case at bar is, in fact, a “picture” or “portrait” of plaintiff. 
 
More helpful are a line of cases holding that any recognizable likeness, not just an 
actual photograph, may qualify as a “portrait or picture.” . . .  
 
Therefore, if defendants had used, for example, a clearly recognizable painting or 
cartoon of plaintiff, it would certainly constitute a “portrait or picture” within the 
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meaning of the statute.  The case of a look-alike, however, is more problematic.  
A painting, drawing or manikin [sic] has no existence other than as a 
representation of something or someone; if the subject is recognizable, then the 
work is a “portrait.”  Defendant Boroff, however, is not a manikin [sic].  He is a 
person with a right to his own identity and his own face.  Plaintiff’s privacy claim 
therefore requires the court to answer the almost metaphysical question of when 
one person’s face, presented in a certain context, becomes, as a matter of law, the 
face of another. 
 
This question is not merely theoretical.  The use in an advertisement of a drawing, 
which has no other purpose than to represent its subject, must give rise to a cause 
of action under the Civil Rights Law, because it raises the obvious implication 
that its subject has endorsed or is otherwise involved with the product being 
advertised.  There is no question that this amounts to an appropriation of another’s 
likeness for commercial advantage. 
 
A living and breathing actor, however, has the right to exploit his or her own face 
for commercial gain.  This right is itself protected by the Civil Rights Law.  The 
privacy law does not prohibit one from evoking certain aspects of another’s 
personality, but it does prohibit one from actually representing oneself as another 
person.  The look-alike situation falls somewhere in between and therefore 
presents a difficult question. 
 
As you can see, New York’s approaches to publicity and privacy rights are both simpler and 
more complex than California’s.  California has overlapping statutory and common law publicity 
rights, while New York has only statutory privacy rights.   
 
A more decisive New York lookalike case is Onassis v. Christian Dior, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1984), which involved ad copy that included a lookalike of former First Lady Jacqueline 
Kennedy Onassis.  The court harshly condemned the defendants: 
 
We are dealing here with actuality and appearance, where illusion often heightens 
reality and all is not quite what it seems.  Is the illusionist to be free to step aside, 
having reaped the benefits of his creation, and permitted to disclaim the very 
impression he sought to create?  If we were to permit it, we would be sanctioning 
an obvious loophole to evade the statute.  If a person is unwilling to give his or 
her endorsement to help sell a product, either at an offered price or at any price, 
no matter—hire a double and the same effect is achieved.  The essential purpose 
of the statute must be carried out by giving it a common sense reading which bars 
easy evasion.  If we truly value the right of privacy in a world of exploitation, 
where every mark of distinctiveness becomes grist for the mills of publicity, then 
we must give it more than lip service and grudging recognition.  Let the word go 
forth—there is no free ride.  The commercial hitchhiker seeking to travel on the 
fame of another will have to learn to pay the fare or stand on his own two feet. 
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Like the Allen court, the judge recognized the need to balance the lookalike’s own privacy 
interests, but the court did not demonstrate much sympathy for her plight: 
 
To paint a portrait of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis is to create a work of art; to 
look like Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis is not.  Miss Reynolds may capitalize on 
the striking resemblance of facial features at parties, TV appearances, and 
dramatic works, but not in commercial advertisements.  Similarly, defendant Ron 
Smith Celebrity Look-Alikes can market its clients for fun and profit in various 
areas, but may not capitalize on natural resemblance to a well-known person for 
trade or advertising.  No one has an inherent or constitutional right to pass himself 
off for what he is not. 
 
Another way that advertisers might try to work around the general prohibition against depicting 
people in ads is by showing only a seemingly unidentifiable portion of the person.  For example, 
the following case addresses ad copy where the people’s faces were not shown: 
 
 
Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 63 N.Y.2d 379 (N.Y. 1984) 
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Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to section 51 of the Civil Rights Law seeking damages from 
defendants for publishing photographs of them for advertising purposes.  It is conceded for 
purposes of this appeal that plaintiffs are the persons shown in the photographs and that 
defendants used the photographs as claimed without their consent.  The legal issue submitted is 
whether a photograph of the nude plaintiffs, mother and child, which shows their bodies full 
length as viewed from a position behind and to the right of them, and which does not show their 
faces, reveals sufficiently identifiable likenesses to withstand defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment.  We hold that it does. 
 
The action arises from these facts. 
 
On the July 4th weekend in 1977, plaintiffs were visiting friends in Woodstock, New York, and 
Susan Cohen and her four-year-old daughter, Samantha, went bathing in a stream located on 
their friends’ private property.  Without their consent, defendant James Krieger took photographs 
of plaintiffs and subsequently sold them to defendant Herbal Concepts, Inc., a seller and 
advertiser of consumer products.  Herbal Concepts used one of the photographs in an 
advertisement for Au Naturel, a product designed to help women eliminate body cellulite, those 
“fatty lumps and bumps that won’t go away.”  The advertisement appeared in two editions of 
House and Garden, which is published by defendant Condé Nast Publications, Inc., and in single 
editions of House Beautiful and Cosmopolitan, which are published by defendant Hearst 
Corporation.  Ira Cohen subsequently recognized his wife and daughter in the advertisements 
while reading one of the magazines and this action followed. . . .  
 
642 
 
 
643 
 
 
. . . [I]n New York privacy claims are founded solely upon sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights 
Law.  The statute protects against the appropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness for 
defendants’ benefit.  Thus, it creates a cause of action in favor of “[a]ny person whose name, 
portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade 
without . . . written consent.”  The action may be brought to enjoin the prohibited use and may 
also seek damages for any injuries sustained including exemplary damages for a knowing 
violation of the statute.  We are concerned in this case with the appropriation of plaintiffs’ 
likenesses.  Defendants claim that there has been no wrong because even if the photograph 
depicts plaintiffs, they are not identifiable from it.  
 
The statute is designed to protect a person’s identity, not merely a property interest in his or her 
“name”, “portrait” or “picture”, and thus it implicitly requires that plaintiff be capable of 
identification from the objectionable material itself.  That is not to say that the action may only 
be maintained when plaintiff’s face is visible in the advertising copy.  Presumably, by using the 
term “portrait” the Legislature intended a representation which includes a facial reproduction, 
either artistically or by photograph, but if we are to give effect to all parts of the statute, it applies 
also to the improper use of a “picture” of plaintiff which does not show the face.  Manifestly, 
there can be no appropriation of plaintiff’s identity for commercial purposes if he or she is not 
recognizable from the picture and a privacy action could not be sustained, for example, because 
of the nonconsensual use of a photograph of a hand or a foot without identifying features.  But 
assuming that the photograph depicts plaintiff, whether it presents a recognizable likeness is 
generally a jury question unless plaintiff cannot be identified because of the limited subject 
matter revealed in the photograph or the quality of the image.  Before a jury may be permitted to 
decide the issue, to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must satisfy the court that 
the person in the photograph is capable of being identified from the advertisement alone and that 
plaintiff has been so identified. 
 
The sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence for purposes of the motion will necessarily depend upon 
the court’s determination of the quality and quantity of the identifiable characteristics displayed 
in the advertisement and this will require an assessment of the clarity of the photograph, the 
extent to which identifying features are visible, and the distinctiveness of those features.  This 
picture depicts two nude persons, a woman and a child, standing in water a few inches deep.  The 
picture quality is good and there are no obstructions to block the view of the subjects.  The 
woman is carrying a small unidentified object in her left hand and is leading the child with her 
right hand.  Neither person’s face is visible but the backs and right sides of both mother and child 
are clearly presented and the mother’s right breast can be seen.  The identifying features of the 
subjects include their hair, bone structure, body contours and stature and their posture.  
Considering these factors, we conclude that a jury could find that someone familiar with the 
persons in the photograph could identify them by looking at the advertisement.  Although we do 
not rely on the fact, it is also reasonable to assume that just as something in the advertising copy 
may aid recognition, identifiability may be enhanced also in photograph depicting two persons 
because observers may associate the two and thus more easily identify them when they are seen 
together. 
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The plaintiffs also submitted evidence that they were identified as the persons in defendants’ 
advertisement by Ira Cohen’s affidavit in which he stated that while leafing through one of 
defendants’ magazines he “recognized [his] wife and daughter immediately.”  That was prima 
facie sufficient. 
 
Defendants contend Mr. Cohen’s affidavit is not probative on the issue of identification because 
he was present when the photograph was taken, as indeed he was.  He was not only present, he 
was incensed by the photographer’s intrusion and chased him away.  Essentially, defendants’ 
contention is that Mr. Cohen’s identification is tainted by this independent knowledge that 
plaintiffs were photographed by defendant Krieger while bathing.  Although Mr. Cohen’s 
presence when the photograph was taken may have increased his ability to identify his wife and 
child, the motion court or the jury at trial could conclude that he also recognized them from the 
photograph and his presence when it was taken, standing alone, does not disqualify him from 
offering evidence that he did so. . . . 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Other Causes of Action?  Could the Cohens have sued the photographer for harassment or public 
disclosure of private facts (discussed in Chapter 13)?  Would the property owner have a claim 
against the photographer for trespass?  Could the advertisers be secondarily liable for that 
trespass?  See the Burgess case discussed in Chapter 11 as well as California Civil Code § 
1708.08 (colloquially referred to as the “California anti-paparazzi statute”), which says in part: 
 
(a) A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the defendant 
knowingly enters onto the land of another person without permission or otherwise 
committed a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with 
the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical 
impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity and the 
physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person . . .  
 
(f) (1) The transmission, publication, broadcast, sale, offer for sale, or other use of 
any visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression that was taken or 
captured in violation of subdivision (a) . . . shall not constitute a violation of this 
section unless the person, in the first transaction following the taking or capture of 
the visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression, publicly 
transmitted, published, broadcast, sold or offered for sale, the visual image, sound 
recording, or other physical impression with actual knowledge that it was taken or 
captured in violation of subdivision (a) . . . and provide compensation, 
consideration, or remuneration, monetary or otherwise, for the rights to the 
unlawfully obtained visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression. 
 
Under a statute like this, could Herbal Concepts have been liable for buying the photos from 
Krieger?  How would this statute fare in a constitutional challenge? 
 
645 
 
Identifiability.  Has the identifiability of people gone up over time?  For example, many people 
now have distinctive tattoos, and automatic facial recognition technology continues to improve.  
Furthermore, it has become fairly common for a seemingly obscure person in a photograph to 
become uniquely identified when seen by millions of Internet users.  See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, 
Subway Fracas Escalates Into Test of the Internet’s Power to Shame, WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 
2005 (discussing the naming and shaming of the South Korean “dog poop girl”).  More 
generally, the segregation of information into “personally identifiable” (like a face) and “non-
personally identifiable” (like a picture of a person’s back) may be a technological and legal 
fiction.  Cf. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
 
One possible inference is that it may be impossible to use an unconsented photograph of a person 
in ad copy, even if his or her face isn’t shown, because anyone in ad copy can become personally 
identifiable if enough people see the photo; inevitably, someone will personally know the 
individual and be able to connect the identity.   
 
Identifiability When the Person Isn’t Shown at All.  Because the photos depicted the individuals’ 
backside, the Cohen case involves somewhat attenuated identifiability.  But just how far can we 
push the identifiability concept?  Could a person be visually identified if you couldn’t see the 
person at all? 
 
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) involved the 
following facts: 
 
Plaintiff Motschenbacher is a professional driver of racing cars, internationally 
known and recognized in racing circles and by racing fans.  He derives part of his 
income from manufacturers of commercial products who pay him for endorsing 
their products. 
 
During the relevant time span, plaintiff has consistently “individualized” his cars 
to set them apart from those of other drivers and to make them more readily 
identifiable as his own.  Since 1966, each of his cars has displayed a distinctive 
narrow white pinstripe appearing on no other car.  This decoration has adorned 
the leading edges of the cars’ bodies, which have uniformly been solid red.  In 
addition, the white background for his racing number “11” has always been oval, 
in contrast to the circular backgrounds of all other cars. 
 
In 1970, defendants, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and William Esty 
Company, produced and caused to be televised a commercial which utilized a 
“stock” color photograph depicting several racing cars on a racetrack.  Plaintiff’s 
car appears in the foregound [sic], and although plaintiff is the driver, his facial 
features are not visible. 
 
In producing the commercial, defendants altered the photograph: they changed the 
numbers on all racing cars depicted, transforming plaintiff’s number “11” into 
“71”; they “attached” a wing-like device known as a “spoiler” to plaintiff’s car; 
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they added the word “Winston,” the name of their product, to that spoiler and 
removed advertisements for other products from the spoilers of other cars.  
However, they made no other changes, and the white pinstriping, the oval 
medallion, and the red color of plaintiff’s car were retained.  They then made a 
motion picture from the altered photograph, adding a series of comic strip-type 
“balloons” containing written messages of an advertising nature; one such balloon 
message, appearing to emanate from plaintiff, was: “Did you know that Winston 
tastes good, like a cigarette should?”  They also added a sound track consisting in 
part of voices coordinated with, and echoing, the written messages.  The 
commercial was subsequently broadcast nationally on network television and in 
color. 
 
Several of plaintiff’s affiants who had seen the commercial on television had 
immediately recognized plaintiff’s car and had inferred that it was sponsored by 
Winston cigarettes. 
 
On the question of identifiability, the court concluded: 
 
[T]he “likeness” of plaintiff is itself unrecognizable; however, the [district] 
court’s further conclusion of law to the effect that the driver is not identifiable as 
plaintiff is erroneous in that it wholly fails to attribute proper significance to the 
distinctive decorations appearing on the car.  As pointed out earlier, these 
markings were not only peculiar to the plaintiff’s cars but they caused some 
persons to think the car in question was plaintiff’s and to infer that the person 
driving the car was the plaintiff. 
 
As a result, the court said that Motschenbacher stated a cause of action for a publicity/privacy 
rights violation.  In effect, the court said that even though viewers could not see Motschenbacher 
personally, his rights were nevertheless violated because his uniquely identifiable car was 
depicted.  Thus, publicity/privacy rights can extend much further than simply protecting 
depictions of people. 
 
If ad copy depicts an empty Cleveland Cavaliers jersey with the number 23, has the advertiser 
violated LeBron James’s publicity rights?  (Ignore any trademark issues, and assume this is 
during the time when LeBron James was still a member of the Cavaliers’ team). 
 
Scope of Consent.  Advertisers can run into trouble even when they get consent from the 
depicted individual.  Consider the following ad for a law firm: 
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The depicted firefighter, Robert Keiley, joined the FDNY in 2004—three years after 9/11.  
Therefore, he was not “there.”  Keiley signed a broad publicity consent, but he says he thought 
that his depiction would be used in a fire prevention ad and the 9/11 picture was photoshopped 
into his hands.  See Reuven Fenton & Jennifer Fermino, Law Firm’s Ad Trick a 9/11 ‘Insult,’ 
N.Y. POST, March 28, 2011.  Did the law firm or its ad agency do anything wrong?   
 
Labor Union Relations.  Many advertising agencies and some large advertisers have signed 
agreements with actors’ labor unions, such as the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA).  Each agreement should be reviewed 
carefully, but in general they (1) require that advertisers use only union members as actors in 
advertisements (with some exceptions, such as showing a company employee doing his or her 
normal job), and (2) specify minimum payments to actors, including payments for pensions and 
health benefits as well as “residuals” (ongoing payments for continued use of the ad copy). 
 
D. Evoking a Persona 
 
As we’ve seen, courts have been fairly expansive in applying the publicity/privacy rights 
doctrines when people are depicted in ad copy.  If the ad copy includes any potentially 
identifiable part of a person—his or her face, body or voice (even a sound-alike)—courts have 
been willing to consider protection.  But what if ad copy incorporates none of these personal 
attributes and yet is still identifiable?  As the next case indicates, publicity rights can be stretched 
to cover that situation too. 
 
 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) 
 
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting from a request for an en banc rehearing. 
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. . . Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.  Creativity is 
impossible without a rich public domain.  Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is 
genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator 
building on the works of those who came before.  Overprotection stifles the very creative forces 
it’s supposed to nurture. 
 
The panel’s opinion is a classic case of overprotection.  Concerned about what it sees as a wrong 
done to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a property right of remarkable and dangerous 
breadth: Under the majority’s opinion, it’s now a tort for advertisers to remind the public of a 
celebrity.  Not to use a celebrity’s name, voice, signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity 
endorses a product; but simply to evoke the celebrity’s image in the public’s mind.  This 
Orwellian notion withdraws far more from the public domain than prudence and common sense 
allow.  It conflicts with the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause.  It raises serious First 
Amendment problems.  It’s bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second look. 
 
II 
 
Samsung ran an ad campaign promoting its consumer electronics.  Each ad depicted a Samsung 
product and a humorous prediction: One showed a raw steak with the caption “Revealed to be 
health food.  2010 A.D.”  Another showed Morton Downey, Jr. in front of an American flag with 
the caption “Presidential candidate.  2008 A.D.”  The ads were meant to convey—humorously—
that Samsung products would still be in use twenty years from now. 
 
The ad that spawned this litigation starred a robot dressed in a wig, gown and jewelry 
reminiscent of Vanna White’s hair and dress; the robot was posed next to a Wheel-of-Fortune-
like game board.  The caption read “Longest-running game show.  2012 A.D.”  The gag here, I 
take it, was that Samsung would still be around when White had been replaced by a robot.* 
 
                                                 
* [Ed. note: As of 2011, Vanna White is still turning letters on Wheel of Fortune, a position she has held since 1982.  
For what it’s worth, steak became a central part of the Atkins Diet fad in the early 2000s, and although Morton 
Downey Jr. did not run for president in 2008, actor Fred Thompson did, and many other actors have won high 
office, including Ronald Reagan (president), Al Franken (U.S. senator from Massachusetts), Jesse Ventura 
(Minnesota governor) and Arnold Schwarzenegger (California governor).] 
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Picture of Vanna White next to close-up of Samsung ad 
 
Perhaps failing to see the humor, White sued, alleging Samsung infringed her right of publicity 
by “appropriating” her “identity.”  Under California law, White has the exclusive right to use her 
name, likeness, signature and voice for commercial purposes.  But Samsung didn’t use her name, 
voice or signature, and it certainly didn’t use her likeness.  The ad just wouldn’t have been funny 
had it depicted White or someone who resembled her—the whole joke was that the game show 
host(ess) was a robot, not a real person.  No one seeing the ad could have thought this was 
supposed to be White in 2012. 
 
The district judge quite reasonably held that, because Samsung didn’t use White’s name, 
likeness, voice or signature, it didn’t violate her right of publicity.  Not so, says the panel 
majority: The California right of publicity can’t possibly be limited to name and likeness.  If it 
were, the majority reasons, a “clever advertising strategist” could avoid using White’s name or 
likeness but nevertheless remind people of her with impunity, “effectively eviscerat[ing]” her 
rights.  To prevent this “evisceration,” the panel majority holds that the right of publicity must 
extend beyond name and likeness, to any “appropriation” of White’s “identity”—anything that 
“evoke[s]” her personality. 
 
III 
 
But what does “evisceration” mean in intellectual property law?  Intellectual property rights 
aren’t like some constitutional rights, absolute guarantees protected against all kinds of 
interference, subtle as well as blatant.  They cast no penumbras, emit no emanations: The very 
point of intellectual property laws is that they protect only against certain specific kinds of 
appropriation.  I can’t publish unauthorized copies of, say, Presumed Innocent; I can’t make a 
movie out of it.  But I’m perfectly free to write a book about an idealistic young prosecutor on 
trial for a crime he didn’t commit.  So what if I got the idea from Presumed Innocent?  So what if 
it reminds readers of the original?  Have I “eviscerated” Scott Turow’s intellectual property 
rights?  Certainly not.  All creators draw in part on the work of those who came before, referring 
to it, building on it, poking fun at it; we call this creativity, not piracy. 
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The majority isn’t, in fact, preventing the “evisceration” of Vanna White’s existing rights; it’s 
creating a new and much broader property right, a right unknown in California law.  It’s 
replacing the existing balance between the interests of the celebrity and those of the public by a 
different balance, one substantially more favorable to the celebrity.  Instead of having an 
exclusive right in her name, likeness, signature or voice, every famous person now has an 
exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her.  After all, that’s all Samsung did: It 
used an inanimate object to remind people of White, to “evoke [her identity].” 
 
Consider how sweeping this new right is.  What is it about the ad that makes people think of 
White?  It’s not the robot’s wig, clothes or jewelry; there must be ten million blond women 
(many of them quasi-famous) who wear dresses and jewelry like White’s.  It’s that the robot is 
posed near the “Wheel of Fortune” game board.  Remove the game board from the ad, and no 
one would think of Vanna White.  But once you include the game board, anybody standing 
beside it—a brunette woman, a man wearing women’s clothes, a monkey in a wig and gown—
would evoke White’s image, precisely the way the robot did.  It’s the “Wheel of Fortune” set, not 
the robot’s face or dress or jewelry that evokes White’s image.  The panel is giving White an 
exclusive right not in what she looks like or who she is, but in what she does for a living . . .  
 
The intellectual property right created by the panel here has [no] essential limitations: No fair use 
exception; no right to parody; no idea-expression dichotomy.  It impoverishes the public domain, 
to the detriment of future creators and the public at large.  Instead of well-defined, limited 
characteristics such as name, likeness or voice, advertisers will now have to cope with vague 
claims of “appropriation of identity,” claims often made by people with a wholly exaggerated 
sense of their own fame and significance.  Future Vanna Whites might not get the chance to 
create their personae, because their employers may fear some celebrity will claim the persona is 
too similar to her own.  The public will be robbed of parodies of celebrities, and our culture will 
be deprived of the valuable safety valve that parody and mockery create. 
 
Moreover, consider the moral dimension, about which the panel majority seems to have gotten so 
exercised.  Saying Samsung “appropriated” something of White’s begs the question: Should 
White have the exclusive right to something as broad and amorphous as her “identity”?  
Samsung’s ad didn’t simply copy White’s schtick—like all parody, it created something new.  
True, Samsung did it to make money, but White does whatever she does to make money, too; the 
majority talks of “the difference between fun and profit,” but in the entertainment industry fun is 
profit.  Why is Vanna White’s right to exclusive for-profit use of her persona—a persona that 
might not even be her own creation, but that of a writer, director or producer—superior to 
Samsung’s right to profit by creating its own inventions?  Why should she have such absolute 
rights to control the conduct of others, unlimited by the idea-expression dichotomy or by the fair 
use doctrine? . . .  
 
V 
 
The majority’s decision also conflicts with the federal copyright system in another, more 
insidious way.  Under the dormant Copyright Clause, state intellectual property laws can stand 
only so long as they don’t “prejudice the interests of other States.”  A state law criminalizing 
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record piracy, for instance, is permissible because citizens of other states would “remain free to 
copy within their borders those works which may be protected elsewhere.”  But the right of 
publicity isn’t geographically limited.  A right of publicity created by one state applies to 
conduct everywhere, so long as it involves a celebrity domiciled in that state.  If a Wyoming 
resident creates an ad that features a California domiciliary’s name or likeness, he’ll be subject to 
California right of publicity law even if he’s careful to keep the ad from being shown in 
California.  
 
The broader and more ill-defined one state’s right of publicity, the more it interferes with the 
legitimate interests of other states.  A limited right that applies to unauthorized use of name and 
likeness probably does not run afoul of the Copyright Clause, but the majority’s protection of 
“identity” is quite another story.  Under the majority’s approach, any time anybody in the United 
States—even somebody who lives in a state with a very narrow right of publicity—creates an ad, 
he takes the risk that it might remind some segment of the public of somebody, perhaps 
somebody with only a local reputation, somebody the advertiser has never heard of.  So you 
made a commercial in Florida and one of the characters reminds Reno residents of their favorite 
local TV anchor (a California domiciliary)?  Pay up. 
 
This is an intolerable result, as it gives each state far too much control over artists in other states.  
No California statute, no California court has actually tried to reach this far.  It is ironic that it is 
we who plant this kudzu in the fertile soil of our federal system. 
 
VI 
 
Finally, I can’t see how giving White the power to keep others from evoking her image in the 
public’s mind can be squared with the First Amendment.  Where does White get this right to 
control our thoughts?  The majority’s creation goes way beyond the protection given a trademark 
or a copyrighted work, or a person’s name or likeness.  All those things control one particular 
way of expressing an idea, one way of referring to an object or a person.  But not allowing any 
means of reminding people of someone?  That’s a speech restriction unparalleled in First 
Amendment law. . . . 
 
The majority dismisses the First Amendment issue out of hand because Samsung’s ad was 
commercial speech.  So what?  Commercial speech may be less protected by the First 
Amendment than noncommercial speech, but less protected means protected nonetheless.  And 
there are very good reasons for this.  Commercial speech has a profound effect on our culture 
and our attitudes.  Neutral-seeming ads influence people’s social and political attitudes, and 
themselves arouse political controversy.  “Where’s the Beef?” turned from an advertising 
catchphrase into the only really memorable thing about the 1984 presidential campaign.  Four 
years later, Michael Dukakis called George Bush “the Joe Isuzu of American politics.” 
 
In our pop culture, where salesmanship must be entertaining and entertainment must sell, the line 
between the commercial and noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has disappeared.  Is the 
Samsung parody any different from a parody on Saturday Night Live or in Spy Magazine?  Both 
are equally profit-motivated.  Both use a celebrity’s identity to sell things—one to sell VCRs, the 
other to sell advertising.  Both mock their subjects.  Both try to make people laugh.  Both add 
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something, perhaps something worthwhile and memorable, perhaps not, to our culture.  Both are 
things that the people being portrayed might dearly want to suppress. 
 
Commercial speech is a significant, valuable part of our national discourse.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized as much, and has insisted that lower courts carefully scrutinize commercial 
speech restrictions, but the panel totally fails to do this. . . . 
 
VII 
 
For better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit.  Millions of people 
toil in the shadow of the law we make, and much of their livelihood is made possible by the 
existence of intellectual property rights.  But much of their livelihood—and much of the 
vibrancy of our culture—also depends on the existence of other intangible rights: The right to 
draw ideas from a rich and varied public domain, and the right to mock, for profit as well as fun, 
the cultural icons of our time. 
 
In the name of avoiding the “evisceration” of a celebrity’s rights in her image, the majority 
diminishes the rights of copyright holders and the public at large.  In the name of fostering 
creativity, the majority suppresses it.  Vanna White and those like her have been given 
something they never had before, and they’ve been given it at our expense.  I cannot agree. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Denouement.  Vanna ultimately won $403,000 in damages in the case. 
 
Who Owns the Right?  Let’s assume that Samsung did, in fact, tortiously invoke the Vanna 
White role in its ads.  Who is the proper plaintiff—Vanna or the Wheel of Fortune producers? 
 
In Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999), Judge Kozinski again 
dissented from the denial of an en banc hearing.  He summarized the case: 
 
Robots again.  In White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th 
Cir. 1992), we held that the right of publicity extends not just to the name, 
likeness, voice and signature of a famous person, but to anything at all that evokes 
that person’s identity.  The plaintiff there was Vanna White, Wheel of Fortune 
letter-turner extraordinaire; the offending robot stood next to a letter board, 
decked out in a blonde wig, Vanna-style gown and garish jewelry.  Dissenting 
from our failure to take the case en banc, I argued that our broad application of 
the right of publicity put state law on a collision course with the federal rights of 
the copyright holder.  
 
The conflict in White was hypothetical, since the defendant (Samsung) did not 
have a license from the Wheel of Fortune copyright holder.  Here it is concrete: 
The panel holds that licensed animatronic figures based on the copyrighted 
Cheers characters Norm and Cliff infringe on the rights of the actors who 
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portrayed them.  As I predicted, White’s voracious logic swallows up rights 
conferred by Congress under the Copyright Act. 
 
Though a bit dated now, Cheers remains near and dear to the hearts of many TV 
viewers.  Set in a friendly neighborhood bar in Boston, the show revolved around 
a familiar scene.  Sam, the owner and bartender, entertained the boys with tales of 
his glory days pitching for the Red Sox.  Coach piped in with sincere, obtuse 
advice.  Diane and Frasier chattered self-importantly about Lord Byron.  Carla 
terrorized patrons with acerbic comments.  And there were Norm and Cliff, the 
two characters at issue here.  Norm, a fat, endearing, oft-unemployed accountant, 
parked himself at the corner of the bar, where he was joined by Cliff, a dweebish 
mailman and something of a know-it-all windbag.  After eleven years on the air, 
the gang at Cheers became like family to many fans, ensuring many more years in 
syndication.  
 
Defendant Host International decided to tap into this keg of goodwill.  After 
securing a license from Paramount, the copyright holder, Host opened a line of 
Cheers airport bars.  To help get patrons into a Cheers mood, Host populated the 
bars with animatronic figures resembling Norm and Cliff: One is fat; the other is 
dressed as a mailman.5  
 
 
 
Plaintiffs George Wendt and John Ratzenberger, the only actors who ever 
portrayed Norm and Cliff, sued Host for unfair competition and violation of their 
right of publicity.  Paramount intervened, claiming that its copyright preempted 
any claim Wendt and Ratzenberger might have under state law.  The district court 
                                                 
5 In a half-hearted attempt to avoid litigation, Host changed the robots’ names to “Hank” and “Bob.” 
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granted summary judgment for the defendants because it found that the robots 
didn’t look like the plaintiffs: “[T]here is [no] similarity at all . . . except that one 
of the robots, like one of the plaintiffs, is heavier than the other. . . . The facial 
features are totally different.”  Relying on White, the panel here reverses but 
offers little explanation beyond the curt assertion that “material facts exist that 
might cause a reasonable jury to find [the robots] sufficiently ‘like’ [Wendt and 
Ratzenberger] to violate” their right of publicity. 
 
After the case was remanded to the district court, the parties settled. 
 
While Wendt is not an advertising law case per se, it does indicate that obtaining a 
copyright license to fictional characters may not be enough to use the fictional characters 
in ad copy.  Where an actor may be publicly associated with the character, the actor’s 
publicity rights mean consent also may be necessary.  Ideally, the producers of the 
fictional work obtain permission from the actor to relicense his or her publicity rights as 
part of a copyright license.  Otherwise, separate permissions from both the copyright 
holder and the actor may be required. 
 
For more on the White case and its implications for the boundaries of publicity rights, see Stacey 
Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003).  
 
 
3. Endorsements and Testimonials 
 
As the previous sections have explored, ads using real people may require their consent even if 
the ad contains nothing untruthful about them.  Under certain circumstances, however, consent 
may also be insufficient.  When ad copy depicts a person voicing a fact or opinion, the person’s 
statements might qualify as an endorsement or testimonial.  The FTC’s Guides Concerning the 
Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (16 C.F.R. Part 255), designed to clarify 
the FTC’s Section 5 powers, define an “endorsement” and “testimonial” (the FTC equates the 
two) as: 
 
any advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or 
depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal 
characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that 
consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or 
experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views 
expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser. 
 
While this definition is not especially clear, it is intended to exclude the statements of people that 
consumers are likely to recognize as actors hired by the advertiser.  A paradigmatic endorsement 
is when a celebrity personally vouches for the product’s quality; a paradigmatic testimonial is 
when a person describes his or her experiences with the product (such as the amount of weight 
lost using a diet aid) or is depicted in before/after pictures.   
 
Some of the key portions of the Endorsement and Testimonials Guidelines provide that: 
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• endorsements must reflect the endorser’s actual beliefs or experiences; 
• endorsers may not make representations that would be deceptive if made by the 
advertiser; 
• if the ad copy says an endorser uses the product, that must be true; 
• if the ad copy represents that the endorser is an expert, the endorser must have the 
requisite qualifications; and 
• the advertiser must disclose any unexpected connections with the endorser that would 
affect the endorsement’s credibility. 
 
Many of these guidelines are not controversial in the abstract; they are logical extensions of 
general false advertising principles.  However, specific applications can raise tricky issues.  For 
example, in the fall of 2009, the FTC amended the guidelines to expressly govern online product 
reviews.  The FTC expressed particular concern about situations where an advertiser provided 
some financial consideration—such as free product samples—to a blogger to write a blog post.  
This led to awkward line-drawing, such as the FTC’s position that traditional journalists do not 
need to disclose receiving free product samples if they do so as part of their jobs, while 
identically situated bloggers do need to make such disclosures.  Not only did the FTC have weak 
justifications for its Internet exceptionalism, but the FTC’s boundaries potentially reach deeply 
into “editorial content” that most people wouldn’t consider advertising at all. 
 
New ad contexts are also relevant.  When a celebrity appears in a traditional thirty-second ad, her 
status as paid endorser is obvious.  But what if she appears on a nighttime talk show and, in 
conversation, mentions how much better she’s doing now that she’s using a particular weight 
loss program?  The FTC’s new guidelines also clarify that, if it would not be obvious to most 
consumers that she was being paid as a spokesperson, disclosure would be required—and, 
because she is a spokesperson, what she says on the talk show is subject to the same 
substantiation requirements as an ordinary ad would be. 
 
Why do you think the FTC is concerned with such situations?  Without this rule, would 
advertisers be able to arbitrage the rules and disseminate unsubstantiated statements in this way, 
or are there other constraints on advertisers that might block abuse of this loophole?  What do 
reasonable consumers expect when they see a celebrity touting some product or service in an 
“interview”?  If the celebrity makes only vague, general statements, would that be puffery?  
Even if consumers don’t understand that she’s a paid spokesperson, are they harmed if all she 
does is puff? 
 
Fabricated Endorsements and the David Manning Incident 
 
Sometimes, advertisers simply fabricate endorsements.  This is commonly associated with online 
consumer reviews, where advertisers can write glowing reviews of their products or critical 
reviews of their competitors’ products.  See, e.g., Press Release, New York Office of the 
Attorney General, Attorney General Cuomo Secures Settlement with Plastic Surgery Franchise 
that Flooded Internet with False Positive Reviews, July 14, 2009 (announcing a $300,000 
settlement with Lifestyle Lift for creating sponsored reviews that purported to be independent). 
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However, fake endorsements have a long pedigree that well predates the Internet.  Sony’s David 
Manning incident provides a useful case study.   
 
For about a year starting in 2000, Sony’s Columbia Pictures ran advertisements for several 
movies containing laudatory comments from “David Manning,” identified as a movie reviewer 
for the Ridgefield (Conn.) Press.  While the Ridgefield Press is a real newspaper, David Manning 
was a fictitious person, and the quotes attributed to Manning were all fabricated.  Why a Sony 
employee chose to engage in this artifice is baffling; as one journalist wrote, “[t]he shocking part 
is that practically every movie these days, good or bad, garners [a] poster-friendly blurb from 
some critic—even no-name hacks toiling for virtually unknown publications.”  Josh Grossberg, 
Sony’s Fake Critic Fallout, E! Online, June 6, 2001. 
 
A Newsweek article on June 2, 2001, exposed Sony’s ruse.  Legal proceedings ensued. 
 
Several private consumer class-action lawsuits were brought against Sony for false advertising, 
unfair competition and related claims.  Sony tried to dismiss one such lawsuit on the grounds that 
its advertisements were protected by California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which applies to certain 
types of speech.  In Rezec v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, 116 Cal. App. 4th 135 (Cal. App. Ct. 
2004), a divided California appellate court rejected Sony’s dismissal attempt because the ads 
were commercial speech, which the court said is not protected by anti-SLAPP laws. 
 
Sony subsequently settled the class-action lawsuit for an announced value of $1.5 million, 
including $500,000 allocated to consumers who saw some of the movies advertised using the 
fake quotes.  Perhaps not surprisingly, only 170 consumers’ claims—totaling less than $5,100—
were tendered.  See William Booth, Big Payday for Lawyers In Sony Fake-Blurb Deal, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 10, 2005.  Sony gave the remaining amount to charity.   
 
Several attorneys general also explored actions against Sony.  Sony settled with Connecticut’s 
attorney general for $325,000, plus the promise to stop using fake quotes and showing ads 
depicting employees giving enthusiastic fake testimonials (a common practice among movie 
studios at the time). 
 
Truthful Endorsements and Consumers Union v. Regina 
 
Although legitimate advertisers like Sony can be caught playing around with fake endorsements, 
it’s more likely you’ll be asked if an advertiser can republish a truthful endorsement.  For 
example, assume that a consumer voluntarily publishes a favorable experience with the 
advertiser’s product on the consumer’s blog, or a newspaper publishes an interview with a 
celebrity where the celebrity mentions that she enjoys the advertiser’s product.  The advertiser 
might wish to republish these favorable statements in its ad copy.  Obviously, the advertiser 
could do so if it procures the person’s consent, but is consent required?  As we have seen 
repeatedly in this chapter and others, consent can be hard to obtain, especially from celebrities.  
The endorser has already publicly made the favorable statements, so the advertiser just wants to 
make these already-expressed views more broadly known.  
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Although doing so may sound innocuous, it is a legally uncertain practice.  The multi-year legal 
battle between the Consumers Union (the publisher of Consumer Reports) and Regina (a vacuum 
manufacturer) illustrates some of the legal conundrums posed by the truthful republication of an 
endorsement.  See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. The New Regina Corp., 664 F. 
Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  The court describes the background: 
 
The July 1983 issue of Consumer Reports contained an article that evaluated and 
compared eighteen different models of lightweight vacuum cleaners.  Defendant 
Regina manufactured four of the models tested.  The article judged Regina’s 
Elictrikbroom Powerteam HB 6910 (“Powerteam 6910”) to be the best of all 
models tested.  CU check-rated the model, signifying that the model was of high 
quality and appreciably superior to the other models that had not been check-
rated.  CU rated the three other Regina models from fair to poor. 
 
On June 28, 1983, counsel for Regina requested permission from Consumers 
Union to quote the favorable evaluation of the Powerteam 6910 in an advertising 
campaign.  Through counsel, CU denied permission.  Sometime between July and 
September, 1983, Regina hired Grey Advertising to create a series of television 
commercials for the Powerteam 6910.  Two of the commercials were eventually 
broadcast on network television.  On September 27, 1983, Regina notified 
Consumers Union that it had begun airing the television commercials which 
quoted verbatim from the evaluation of the Powerteam 6910.  The first 
commercial, entitled “Squid,” featured a voice over announcer who states that the 
Powerteam 6910 is “the only lightweight that Consumer Reports says was an 
adequate substitute for a full size vacuum.”  While the announcer is speaking, a 
disclaimer appears on the screen noting that “Consumer Reports is not affiliated 
with Regina and does not endorse products.”  The second commercial, entitled 
“Consumer Reports,” includes several verbatim quotations from the evaluation of 
the Powerteam 6910.  [The four quotes: (1) And Consumer Reports states, 
“Regina Powerteam—far ahead of the pack in cleaning ability.”  (2) Of all the 
lightweights tested “only one worked well.”  (3) On medium pile carpeting 
Powerteam “did the job with the least effort.”  (4) In fact, it’s the only one 
Consumer Reports calls an “adequate substitute for a full-sized vacuum.”]  These 
quotations flash on the screen as the announcer reads them.  Each time the 
announcer mentions Consumer Reports, the same disclaimer used in Squid 
appears on the screen. 
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After viewing the commercials, CU demanded that Regina withdraw them 
immediately.  Regina refused.  The company did, however, alter the disclaimer to 
read that “Consumer Reports is not affiliated with Regina and does not endorse 
Regina products or any other products.” 
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On the surface, the legal problems may be hard to see.  Regina used, at most, five short 
quotations, attributed its source (as, indeed, it may be required to do), and disclaimed any 
affiliation with the source.   
 
Perhaps some of the problem lies with the unique nature of Consumers Union and Consumer 
Reports.  The court describes: 
 
CU is a New York not-for-profit corporation organized in 1936.  CU’s primary 
purpose is independently to test consumer products and to publish the test results 
and evaluations in its monthly magazine Consumer Reports.  Circulation of 
Consumer Reports exceeds three million copies per month.  CU copyrights each 
issue of Consumer Reports. 
 
CU alleges that it has gained a reputation over the past fifty years for impartial 
and objective testing of and reporting on consumer products.  To foster and 
maintain its reputation for objectivity, CU follows a non-commercialization 
policy.  Under that policy the organization accepts no outside advertising in any 
of its publications and has steadfastly refused to grant permission to others to use 
its name or copyrighted materials in advertisements.2  CU contends that this arms-
length relationship with manufacturers distinguishes it from other testing 
organizations and publishers which provide consumer advice.  CU further asserts 
that were manufacturers routinely permitted to utilize its published evaluations 
and to associate its name with their products in advertising campaigns, the public 
would lose confidence in CU’s neutrality. 
 
As a result, Consumers Union sued Regina for the advertisements principally on trademark and 
copyright grounds.  The district court initially granted Consumers Union a preliminary injunction 
on copyright grounds.  Regina appealed that to the Second Circuit, which reversed the injunction 
and sent the case back to the district court.  Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General 
Signal Corp. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).  In the 1987 ruling, Regina sought summary judgment.  
The district court refused. 
 
On the copyright claim, Regina argued fair use, so the court assumed the validity of Consumers 
Union’s copyright and “that defendants’ quotation of portions of the Consumer Reports 
evaluation infringed CU’s copyright.”  That seems like a significant concession for Regina to 
make.  Do you think Regina took copyrightable portions of Consumers Union’s copyrights?  
(Would you have noticed the potential copyright issue in quoting a consumer’s online review of 
your client’s product?) 
 
                                                 
2 Since 1936 each issue of Consumer Reports has stated in substance: 
Consumers Union accepts no advertising or product samples and is not beholden in any way to any 
commercial interest.  Its Ratings and product reports are solely for the use of readers of CONSUMER 
REPORTS.  Neither the Ratings nor the reports may be used in advertising or for any commercial purpose.  
CU will take all steps open to it to prevent such uses of its material, its name, or the name of CONSUMER 
REPORTS. 
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With respect to Regina’s copyright fair-use argument, “drawing the necessary inferences in 
plaintiff’s favor, the Court concluded 1) that defendants have not demonstrated that they are 
entitled to prevail on the defense of fair use as a matter of law, and 2) that triable issues of fact 
concerning harm to CU’s copyright remain.”   
 
Regarding the Lanham Act claim, the court said that the “ultimate issue in this case is whether 
there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to 
be misled into believing that CU sponsored or otherwise approved the use of its mark in 
defendants’ advertisements.”  To establish this, Consumers Union conducted two consumer 
surveys.  The surveys indicated that 19% of consumers who saw the “Squid” ad and 23% of 
those who saw the “Consumer Reports” ad agreed that Consumer Reports was “affiliated” with 
Regina.  The remainder either could not tell (48% for “Squid”/22% for “Consumer Reports”) or 
answered “no” (33%/55%).  Based on the ad, 9% of those who saw “Squid” thought Consumer 
Reports had been paid for the use of its name, and 25% of those who saw “Consumer Reports” 
did so.  Similar percentages of consumers thought Regina had paid Consumer Reports to test its 
product.   
 
In a second survey, “27% of those viewing ‘Squid’ and 45% of those viewing ‘Consumer 
Reports’ believed, based on the Commercial, that CONSUMER REPORTS had authorized the use of 
its name in the Commercials (those who responded “cannot tell” numbered 64%/46%)”; while 
“13% of those viewing ‘Squid’ and 19% of those viewing ‘Consumer Reports’ believed, based 
on the Commercial, that CONSUMER REPORTS was affiliated with Regina (those who could not 
tell numbered 52%/29%)”; “15% of those viewing ‘Squid’ and 16% of those viewing ‘Consumer 
Reports’ believed, based on the Commercial, that CONSUMER REPORTS had been paid for the use 
of its name;” and nearly identical percentages believed that Regina had paid Consumer reports to 
test its product. 
 
As usual, Regina objected to the survey, but let’s assume the survey results are scientifically 
defensible.  What do the results tell you about likely confusion over endorsement?  In general, 
the ad where Regina mentioned Consumer Reports four times had more problematic numbers 
than the ad where Regina mentioned the magazine only once.  What do you think the “baseline” 
level of confusion is?  
 
Based on the survey numbers, the court also said that it was not clear whether Regina’s 
disclaimers had effectively dispelled the confusion.  The court also sidestepped Regina’s First 
Amendment defense. 
 
Would it change the result if Regina used the same quotes but attributed them in a different 
manner?  Say, “to a leading independent testing organization” or “a leading consumer review 
publication.”  That would not resolve any copyright problems, but does it resolve the implied 
endorsement problem?  Would such an ad be as desirable to Regina?  Under the substantiation 
doctrine, how precisely must Regina identify the source of comparative factual claims? 
 
When the publicity rights considerations are added, the situation gets even less clear.  For 
example, in 2007, Oprah said Ciao Bella Blood Orange Sorbetto was one of her “favorite 
things.”  Can Ciao Bella advertise this fact without obtaining Oprah’s permission?  Oprah may in 
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fact be willing to grant permission, but what if she doesn’t?  Without Oprah’s permission, Ciao 
Bella would have to avoid any copyright issues, trademark issues (“Oprah” is a trademark) and 
publicity rights issues for using Oprah’s name in the ad copy.  How would the publicity rights 
analysis look?  How does the general lack of judicial sympathy shown toward advertisers in this 
chapter color your analysis?   
 
Are Celebrity Endorsements Worth It?  There is some evidence that celebrity endorsements are 
not necessarily a good deal for advertisers.  See Peter Dabol, Celebrities in Advertising Are 
Almost Always a Big Waste of Money, Advertising Age, Jan. 12, 2011 (“[A] celebrity has little to 
no impact on an ad's effectiveness.  In fact, regardless of gender or age, ads without celebrities 
out-performed ads with them”).  In contrast, consumer “word-of-mouth” recommendations have 
substantial selling power.  See, e.g., Jack Neff, GE Study Proves Consumers Respond More to 
Shared Content Than to Paid Placements, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 25, 2012.   
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